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relatively stable over the years or whether they have changed radically
from time to time. Does, as Story once thought, 13 the loyalty we would
expect Justices to feel to the Court cause them to draw lines between
permissible and impermissible limits in number and tone of dissenting
opinions? How far can a Justice go his own individualistic way without
incurring sanctions from his brethren? What sanctions do the Justices
have to use against a lone wolf and under what kinds of circumstances
are these sanctions likely to be effective?
It would seem no less true of collegial courts than of legislatures that
they are social systems' 4 as well as formal, legal institutions. Knowing
the canons of conduct judges expect to be observed in their relations
with one another is as vital to a full understanding of the judicial branch
of government as knowing the folkways of the Senate would be to an
understanding of the legislative branch.
From my own experience I know that all too often the gist of a reviewer's criticism is that the author wrote the book he wanted rather than the
book the reviewer wanted him to write. Nevertheless, it seems to me that
the only justification, aside from antiquarian interest, for a full length
study of a man like Daniel is the light that it throws on the important
figures, institutions, and processes with which he was in close contact.
This volume offers such light in a very sparse and indirect manner. It is a
far better life history than Daniel deserved, but it is not a book that
demonstrates Frank's usually perceptive grasp of what is significant about
the Court and its work.
WALTER F. MURPHY*
13 Letter from Mr. Justice Story to James Kent, June 26, 1837, in Fairman, The
Retirement of FederalJudges, 51 HARv. L. REv. 397, 412-14 (1938).
14 See WAHLKE, EULAU, BUCHANAN & FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM (1962).
* Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University.

Delinquency and Drift. By DAVID MATZA. New York: John Wiley &

Sons, Inc., 1964. Pp. x, 199. $4.50.
The current genetic, constitutional, psychological and socio-cultural
explanations of juvenile delinquency are incorrect, according to sociologist David Matza. Instead, he believes, the delinquent is a drifter, made
so in part by the self-same legal institutions which we have established to
help him.
Dr. Matza is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of
California and a Research Associate in the Berkeley Center for the
Study of Law and Society. In this erudite essay, which has an excellent
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bibliography attached, he carefully examines the classical picture of the
delinquent as seen by each school of thought. He is particularly critical
of the "positivist" school of criminology and its erroneous focus, as he
sees it, on individual motivation. He suggests that these various theories
have serious theoretical shortcomings-they tend to predict more delinquency than actually occurs; they allow the juvenile no possibility of
free will or freedom of choice; they do not explain adequately the
clinical observation that 60-85 per cent of all delinquents outgrow their
delinquency after age 20; they all see the delinquent as different from
the normal juvenile, and do not explain his periods of conformity.
In contrast, Dr. Matza views the average delinquent as being quite
different from the stereotype ordinarily painted by criminologists. He
believes that delinquents are not markedly different from non-delinquents,
and that they are partially free to choose alternatives as they vacillate
in a drifting manner between conventional and criminal actions.
The juvenile becomes a drifter, according to Dr. Matza, as a result of
a deep feeling of injustice engendered by the way he is treated by our
juvenile authorities and institutions. Our legal approach to the juvenile
apparently serves to neutralize episodically his moral restraints and his
commitment to law and order. The resulting feeling of irresponsibility
causes him deliberately to break society's rules, aware that he is so doing
and aware of the nature of his deed.
Dr. Matza tilts his lance at an interesting assortment of juvenile legal
practices, all of which he blames for helping set the juvenile adrift. He
feels that the current areas of confusion between psychiatry and the
law provide what he calls "subterranean support" for the juvenile's
delinquencies. In addition he suggests that current juvenile court philosophy with its "supporting" attitudes and attempts to "understand" the
"individual child," the procedural "laxity" of the court, its child welfare
ideology, the court's great reliance on professional and psychiatric judgment, its social work "bureaucracy," and the pressure exerted on the
judge by his social work "underlings" for "mercy" for the child-all really
reinforce and confirm the juvenile's feelings of irresponsibility, feed his
sense of injustice, and so ultimately contribute to his becoming delinquent.
This is further aided, continues Dr. Matza, by the juvenile court failure
to produce proof of guilt, by the dependence on confession, by the
occasional inconsistencies in the administration of justice, by the great
power and discretion possessed by the juvenile court and by the diffuse
principles that may guide its decisions. In addition, the concept of
"individualized" treatment and justice, the delinquent's inability to
understand most of the words used in court, the delinquent's view of the
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court's workings as being full of hypocrisy, of rank favoritism and of
whimsical inconsistencies, and his view of officials as morally, technically
and personally incompetent-all contribute to the juvenile's sense of
injustice and his resulting loss of moral restraints.
Dr. Matza apparently has had extensive experience with slum-produced
delinquents. He succeeds in presenting a vivid description of how they
consciously think and feel. However, he also is a sociological conceptdropper of the old school. As a result, as a psychoanalyst who is not unduly
versed in sociological shorthand, I frequently had the feeling that I was
eavesdropping on a private family argument between the author and
other sociologists, with the combatants-although using English wordsactually communicating with each other in a secret code known only
to themselves.
To further complicate the matter, Dr. Matza writes in a most flowery
manner. It was hard to avoid the feeling that I was wading through
acres of beautiful but tenaciously clinging verbiage, with the siren
attraction of the individual words interfering with attempts to follow
the main ideas. However, if I really understand Dr. Matza's principal
thesis correctly, then I must take issue with many of his major notions.
Although Dr. Matza shows an unusual understanding of psychoanalytic
theory, he apparently is unaware of some of its formulations in recent
years. He may be surprised to know that many analysts agree with
him completely on the question of the delinquent having a measure of
"free will." Current psychoanalytic theory makes much of the individual's
ability to perform independent judgments and 'to exercise freedom of
choice without interference from childhood-derived inner mental conflicts.
As Dr. Matza puts it, "Man's actions are variably free."
I also agree with his notion that our current legal practices may be
contributing, unwittingly, to the problem of juvenile delinquency. However, I disagree completely with his view that our method of administering juvenile justice is a basic cause of juvenile delinquency. As I see
it, our failure to provide adequate resources for preventing, spotting,
diagnosing, treating and rehabilitating the delinquent is contributing
to the increase in juvenile delinquency but not to its cause.
I must say that Dr. Matza's main thesis has a most familiar ring to
the psychoanalyst who, long since, has grown accustomed to having
his patients ultimately blame the psychoanalyst for all the patient's
problems. Dr. Matza advances the corresponding idea that the very
institutions that are designed to help the delinquent actually are helping to make him delinquent. To me, this is a sheer uncritical acceptance
both of the delinquent's own rationalizations about his troubles and of his
attempts to shift the responsibility for them onto the outside adult
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world. Dr. Matza seems to have taken them at face value, dressed them
up in fancy sociological garb and advanced them as the newest thing in
etiologies. Juvenile delinquency existed before the invention of the
juvenile court and the creation of the psychiatrist, the social worker,
and the probation and parole officer. Who made the juvenile drift then?
Although Dr. Matza pays lip service to the concept of a multiple complex interlocking etiology for delinquency, his approach suggests that
he still has fallen into the trap of viewing delinquents as a homogeneous
group rather than appreciating the uniqueness of each delinquent. Every
individual has a personality that, like his fingerprints, is completely
unique to himself and is totally different from that of any other individual. Delinquents certainly have one thing in common, their symptom
of anti-social behavior. But this is only a surface symptom. As far as
causes are concerned, there are as many different causes for delinquency
as there are, for example, for headaches or for indigestion.
Dr. Matza is too readily satisfied with neat labels, surface behavior
and superficial explanations. Giving something a name does not mean
that we necessarily understand it any better. To the casual observer, the
average adolescent may appear as someone full of delinquent impulses
that are being held in by surface controls, with the delinquent impulses
being released whenever the controls are weakened. Unfortunately for
Dr. Matza's thesis, this mechanistic view simply is not true. For most
delinquents, the anti-social act is not a breakthrough of inner violent
impulses. Instead it represents one of many possible methods available
to adolescents of dealing with a variety of inner conflicts stirred up by
some current stress. Other juveniles, exposed to identical stress situations, will handle the inner conflicts that are triggered in a completely
different manner, e.g., through physical symptoms or by becoming a
Beatles' fan. And still others will not be vulnerable to that particular
stress and will show no unusual reaction.
The frequent spontaneous disappearance of delinquent behavior after
the age of twenty is again a complex and highly individual matter. For
some it represents improved personality functioning, now that the young
adult no longer has to cope with inner biochemical pubertal pressures.
For others it reflects the young adult's ability to respond to the challenges
and opportunities of greater independence. For still others it merely
means a change in symptoms, with the anti-social tendencies being
hidden under a neurotic facade. He is no longer delinquent; now he has
become a suffering neurotic. However, his delinquent soul is readily
apparent to his children who may use it as their model.
Finally, I might point out that the psychoanalyst is even more horrified
than Dr. Matza by the legal misuse of analytic understanding. The
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analyst's wish and ability to explain why, on the basis of his preceding
traumatic life experiences, an individual commits a specific offense
should be a matter that is entirely unrelated to the legal issue of a person's responsibility for the control of his behavior. To assume that the
ability to 'explain a criminal act in effect explains away the act is a
misconception of the role of the analyst. The Illinois statute states in
part that "a person is not criminally responsible for [his] conduct if at
the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease . . .. he lacks
substantial capacity... to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law."' If honestly applied, this statute would result in very few criminals,
if any, ever being convicted.
NER LITrNER, M.D.*

I ILL. REv.

STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (1963).

* Medical Director of Child Therapy Program, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis;
Chairman of Advisory Committee on Child Psychiatry Services, Illinois Department of
Mental Health.

Professor Matza is a sociologist and has written in that field. It follows
that Delinquency and Drift is a book of sociology, or more particularly
perhaps criminology, and will be identified as such in that discipline. On
these grounds lawyers are permitted to ignore it and many of them doubtless will do so.
To ignore this short book would be a mistake, however, for it is also a
modest' but unmistakably valuable work of jurisprudence. The book is
about the legal world of the juvenile delinquent. I mean just that. The
book is not about the legal world that society imposes on the adolescent,
nor is it about the more& of delinquency, nor it is about the causes of
delinquency, thougE Professor Matza perforce makes extensive references
to these and other facets of delinquency. Professor Matza's principal
Undertaking is to show how the delinquent perceives the legal order of
adult'society, both in its substantive and its procedural aspects, and therewith 'to say 's61ithing about the morality and the efficacy of the legal
order itself.
- There are three principal points to his discussion. First, the juvenile
delinquent has no settled attitude toward the' legitimate social order.
His-view is rather a: changeable amalgam of adherence, defiance, indifference and misapprehension. This attitude Professor Matza calls "drift,"
which is his unfortunately new buffrttnately simpler and I think more
suggestive term for the 61der sociological concept 'of anomie. Second, the
delinquent's concept of -the-law parallels the authentic version but is at a
number of key points a distortion of it. Thus, the delinquent understands
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that it is wrong to steal, in his terms as well as society's, but he also has
or may assume the view that there is a wider scope for excuse and justification than the law allows. No doubt these views are often expressed
retrospectively of the crime, as invented rationalization. But this does
not detract from the fact that the delinquent's attitude toward stealing
is essentially similar to that of legitimate society. Indeed, the similarity
makes it all the more necessary and appropriate that the law's concepts
of crime be carefully iterated. Any lawyer who remembers encountering
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens' or Morisette v. United States2 knows that
this is both important and difficult. That the delinquent does not have a
proper grasp of the limits of excuse and justification is therefore not
mysterious, nor should it lead to the conclusion that he has no respect
whatever for conventional legal standards.
Professor Matza's third main point is that the system of justice presently brought to bear on the delinquent, the law and practice of the
juvenile court, represents a pervasive confusion of principle. The confusion is that which Professor Francis Allen has elucidated in his essay,
Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal:3 is the chief significance to
be attributed to a criminal act the fact that it likely evidences a personality in need of (and susceptible to) rehabilitation, or that it represents a
violation of the law which should therefore occasion blame and perhaps
punishment? This confusion of principle begets in the juvenile court a
confusion of purpose and practice which Professor Matza mercilessly expounds. His disquisition culminates in a Swiftian description that is a
4
delight.
The confusion of purpose and of practice is evident to the delinquent.
His most charitable interpretation of the system and its participants is
that they are weak; his more likely interpretation is that they are hypocritical.5 Neither interpretation leads him to stop drifting. Rather the
shifting winds of adult rhetoric may blow him on a still more erratic
course. For the delinquent, the official institutions of society appear to
be proceeding without principle, or worse yet with principles whose con1 [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273.
2

342 U.S. 246 (1951).

3 Reprinted in ALLEN, THE BORERLAND OF
4 See especially pp. 119-31.

THE

CRiMINAL LAw 25 (1964).

5 The point is well summed up by a delinquent, reported originally in FREEMAN,
OUT OF THE BUPNiNG: THn STORY OF A Boy GANG LEADER 11 (1960) and quoted by Matza
at pp. 135-36: "In the children's court, I had found, there were two kinds of judges:
bleeding hearts and swords of the Lord. Bleeding hearts called me son and wept over
me; swords of the Lord shouted I ought to be locked up in a zoo. But I thought there
was no real difference between the two. If there was room for you in the slammers,
either kind sent you up."
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flict has been left unresolved; the legal order to which he is supposed to
accommodate himself is aimless, unpredictable and incomprehensible.
Who is to say that the delinquent is erroneous in reaching this conclusion? And if he is not, Professor Matza has written a work of jurisprudence, a thoughtful critique of a legal subsystem that suffers an impoverishment of responsible principle.
I have only two criticisms of Professor Matza's book that are worth
mentioning. The first is that the beginning part is somewhat ponderous.
This I think is chiefly attributable to the author's attempt to make the
customary obeisance to received sociological theory and authority. The
omission of this professional amenity would have improved the work,
as it would many others. The second point is that it is Judge, or Justice,
Cardozo, not Cardoza. The misspelling is surprising because Professor
Matza is generally sure-handed in his use of legal references and legal
concepts.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
* Administrator, American Bar Foundation, and Professor of Law, The University
of Chicago.

